TINKER v. DES MOINES INDEPENDENT COMMUNITY SCHOOL DISTRICT

393 U.S. 503 (1969)

I. TYPE OF ACTION: This is a constitutional law case involving alleged violations of the First Amendment’s provisions for freedom of expression.

II. FACTS: John Tinker, his sister, Mary Beth, and fellow petitioner Christopher Eckhardt were all teenagers attending schools in Des Moines, Iowa. In December of 1965, these students and a group of adults held a meeting at the Eckhardt home and resolved to express their objections to the Vietnam War by wearing black armbands during the winter break and by fasting on select days. The students had protested other issues before in like manner by wearing armbands. Somehow, the administration of the school system learned of the students’ intentions to wear the armbands and adopted a policy prohibiting this. Under the policy, any student wearing an armband to school would be asked to remove it. If the student refused, he or she would be suspended from school. The students would be permitted to return only when the armbands were left at home. The students, aware of the policy, challenged the administration.

On December 16, 1965, Mary Beth and Christopher wore black armbands to school. John wore an armband to school the next day. School administrators confronted all three students and asked them to remove the armbands, which they refused to do. As per the school policy, all three students were suspended from school until they would come back without the armbands. They did not return to school until New’ Year’s Day, after the planned period for wearing armbands had expired. The three students’ parents filed suit against the school system. The plaintiffs sought nominal damages and an injunction restraining the school officials from disciplining students for wearing black armbands.

At the district court level, the complaint was dismissed upon the rationale that the school authorities’ action was reasonable to prevent a disruption of discipline in the schools. The district court in Tinker acknowledged but declined to follow another circuit's holding in a similar case. There, the court held that the wearing of symbols such as black armbands cannot be prohibited unless it “materially and substantially interfere(s) with the requirements of appropriate discipline in the operation of the school.” Burnside v. Byars, 363 F.2d 744, 749 (1966). The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district court’s ruling against the students in Tinker without opinion, which prompted an appeal to the Supreme Court.

III. LEGAL ISSUES/QUESTIONS: Is a regulation prohibiting students from wearing armbands to school to protest the Vietnam war and providing for suspension of any student refusing to remove an armband an unconstitutional denial of students' right of expression of opinion under the First Amendment in the absence of any evidence that wearing the armbands leads to a disruption in school discipline?

IV. HOLDING: Yes. The contrary opinion of the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit was reversed and remanded.

V. RATIONALE: The Court held that wearing an armband to express a view is a symbolic act under the Free Speech Clause of First Amendment. Also, even in school environments, First Amendment rights are available to students who do not “shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate.” Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District, 393 U.S. 503 (1969) at 506. At the same time, however, the Court acknowledged that school administrators have the duty and authority to prescribe and control conduct in the schools, consistent with fundamental constitutional safeguards. Yet, a mere “apprehension of disturbance” in school discipline is not enough for administrators to act to impinge upon the students’ rights to freedom of expression.

Relying on the logic expressed in the case of Burnside v. Byars, 363 F.2d 744, 749 (1966), the Court held that for school officials to prohibit some form of expression, they must demonstrate that the exercise of the forbidden right of expression of opinion would “materially and substantially interfere with” school discipline. The Court indicated that in the instant case, an “examination of the record fails to yield evidence that the school authorities had reason to anticipate that the wearing of the armbands would substantially interfere with the work of the school or impinge upon the rights of other students.” Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District, 393 U.S. 503 (1969) at 509.

School authorities, because they do not possess absolute authority over their students, cannot act to merely suppress an unpopular viewpoint. Rather, students are "persons" under the Constitution, are due constitutional protection, and are entitled to freedom of expression of their views in the absence of some constitutionally valid reason to regulate their speech. Whenever and wherever he or she chooses, if he or she does so without materially and substantially interfering with school operation and without colliding with rights of others, a student is free to express his or her views. Only “conduct by the student, in class or out of it, which for any reason…materially disrupts classwork or involves substantial disorder or invasion of the rights of others is…not immunized by the constitutional guarantee of freedom of speech.” Blackwell v. Issaquena County Board of Education, 363 F.2d 749 (C.A. 5^th Cir. 1966.)

VI. CRITIQUE: The importance of the constitutional protection afforded to freedom of expression by the First Amendment cannot be overstated. It is a cornerstone upon which rest the civil liberties treasured by Americans. However, at the same time, freedom of expression cannot be truly perfect. Just as one cannot shout “Fire!” in a crowded theater because doing so would produce a panicked egress from the hall, persons in some institutional situations should not be allowed carte blanche to express anything they wish because doing so might compromise the ability of the institution to fulfill its mission. The interests of freedom of expression and those of the need to preserve order in certain situations must be balanced.

In Tinker, the Court deemed that wearing an armband as a political protest is a symbolic act and therefore a form of "pure speech". The speech or expression is "pure" because it is not accompanied by form of disruptive conduct. Rather, wearing the armbands was a "silent, passive expression of opinion, unaccompanied by any disorder or disturbance on the part of petitioners." Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District, 393 U.S. 503 (1969) at 508.

The school policy prohibiting the wearing of armbands was tantamount to prohibiting a discussion of the Vietnam conflict in the hallway. That type of prohibition would clearly be unacceptable under the First Amendment. The administration, however, sought to justify the prohibition on the grounds that wearing the armbands would inflame other students and, in do doing, disrupt discipline in the schools.

The fact that nothing happened when the Tinkers and their associate wore the armbands would seem to belie the school system’s fear. All that did occur was that a few other students made some vaguely antagonistic remarks outside of class to the students wearing the armbands. There were, however, no credible threats of violence nor were there any actual acts of violence committed on school premises. The Court in Tinker deemed that without actual, credible evidence that a prohibition of expression is necessary to avoid "material and substantial interference with school work or discipline", that prohibition cannot be constitutionally permissible. Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District, 393 U.S. 503 (1969) at 511.

In a dissenting opinion, two Justices would have upheld the school regulation in support of the need to maintain discipline and good order in the schools. Truly, this need is important. However, the students’ actions in Tinker do not really rise to the level of threatening school discipline and good order.

The Majority indicated that, “Undifferentiated fear or apprehension of disturbance is not enough to overcome the right to freedom of expression.” Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District, 393 U.S. 503 (1969) at 508. Simply the mere fear of a disturbance, then, is insufficient to abridge the rights of students to freedom of expression. Citing the case of Terminello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1 (1949), the Court opined that the possibility of disruptive speech occurring in an educational environment is, according to the Constitution, a real and necessary risk that schools simply must tolerate in their day-to-day operations: “Any word spoken, in class, in the lunchroom, or on the campus, that deviates from the views of another person may start an argument or cause a disturbance. But our Constitution says we must take this risk.” Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District, 393 U.S. 503 (1969) at 508. Schools, after all, exist to educate and part of education should involve exposure to dissonant beliefs to both promote tolerance and to encourage students to contemplate opposing issues.

Considering the primacy of the importance of the First Amendment in our society, the relatively benign nature of the method of expression employed by the students, the lack of disruption to the school setting that was ultimately elicited by the wearing of the armbands, and the nature of schools as being institutions where ideas are meant to be exchanged, this author agrees with the Court’s ruling in Tinker. The administrative prohibition against wearing the black armbands by students seeking to express their disagreement with the war in Vietnam violated the students’ rights to freedom of expression as guaranteed by the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment of the United States Constitution.